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Abstract  
The appointment of special interest councillors in urban councils has courted a lot of controversy as this has 
been viewed as a political ploy by ZANU PF to counter the MDC-run councils. Both political and official 
views have been accorded to the appointment of ‘special interest councillors. The arbitrary powers of the 
Minister of Local Government Rural and Urban development (MLGRUD) has incurred the wrath of the 
public who view these legislative powers as being used  to gain political mileage by ZANU PF party as well 
as a vindictive measure against residents for failing to vote for ZANU PF in Local Government elections, 
among other electoral processes. In this paper a normative legislat ive framework involving international, 
regional instruments as well as national legislat ion is used to determine the extent to which the legislation and 
practice of appointing ‘special interest’ councillors in terms of section 4 A of the Urban Councils Act (2008) 
complies and resonates with democratic practice. The position of the new Constitution of Zimbabwe on local 
governance provides a more democratic dispensation. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
While the phenomenon of appointing ‘special interest’ councillors has been in existence in rural district  
councils since independence, it is the adoption of the same practice in urban councils that has attracted much 
publicity. Through an interparty consensus among the main polit ical part ies namely the Zimbabwe African 
National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU PF) as well as the two Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) 
formations, amendment to the Urban Councils’ Act culminated in the enactment of Statutory Instrument 
79/2010 which  gave rise to section 4 A of the UCA which  empowers the Min ister of Local Government Rural 
and Urban Development (MLGRUD) to appoint ‘special interest’ councillors to every  urban council.  
According to the Act, the appointed councillors should not exceed 25% of elected councillors.1 This paper is a 
result of a survey of the composition of 20 major urban councils across the country. It is from this composition 
of appointed special interest councillors that the author seeks to establish the extent to which the composition 
complies with the elements of democratic urban governance, namely responsiveness, inclusiveness and equity, 
transparency, accountability, community part icipation, cooperation between levels of government as well as 
effectiveness and efficiency. 
BACKGROUND TO THE ENACTMENT OF SECTION 4 A OF THE URBAN COUNCILS ACT  
The practice of appointing councillors to local councils was put in place as part of the postcolonial local 
government reforms initially implemented in rural areas. However the practice was only implemented in 
district rural councils in terms of District and Rural Councils Act 2. The practice was introduced at a time when 
ZANU PF was the sole political party with very little or no opposition to its hegemony as has been discussed 
above. The appointments were therefore made to consolidate ZANU PF hold on political power in rural areas 
as has been discussed above. The councillors were appointed on the basis of expertise and were known as  
‘special interest’ councillors responsible for specialist areas such as  
education, health, the disabled, women’s affairs as well as legal issues.  It should be noted that because ZANU 
PF was the main political party then, it dominated local government both in rural and urban councils. It was 
not until the end of the 1990s that ZANU PF began to face a threat to its political hegemony from emerging 
political parties, notably the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), a broad-based political movement 
which became increasingly popular from 2000 onwards. This emergence of the MDC and its subsequent 
domination of urban councils in the elections that were conducted in the elections of 2000 put ZANU PF’s 
political hegemony under threat.  
This led to ZANU PF seeking ways of diluting the MDC’s dominance in urban councils. On the eve of the 
2008 Harmonised Presidential, Senatorial, House of Assembly and Local Government Elections, sensing 
possible defeat, and vested with much experience in the workings of local government, ZANU PF initiated 
deliberations to amend the Urban Councils Act to incorporate the practice of appointing special interest 
                                                 
1 S 4 A (1) (b), Urban Councils Act. 
2 S11, District and Rural Councils Act . 
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councillors in urban areas. This culminated in the amendment of the Urban Councils’ Act on 8 April 2008, 
leading to the enactment of section 4A of the Urban Councils Act. 
Through statutory instrument 79/2010 which gave rise to section 4A of the Urban Councils Act, the Minister 
of Local Government is vested with authority to fix the maximum possible number of special interest 
councillors for every urban area, without consulting the residents in the ward.3 Under this legislation, the 
MLGRUD makes additional appointments to urban councils. The introduction of special interest councillors 
was based on the policy rationale that the new elected councillors need to work alongside experienced 
individuals and to represent interests of marginalised groups in society.  
PUBLIC REACTION TO THE APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL INTEREST COUNCILLORS  
The major reason for discussing the issue of appointing special interest councillors emanates from the 
vigorous reactions and debates that this practice has caused among all and sundry. Most urban local councils 
argue that the appointment of special interest councillors has become a financial burden on the councils since 
the appointees should be paid by the respective councils where they are appointed.4The print mediahas also 
highlighted the appointment of special interest councillors in terms of section 4A of the Urban Councils Act. 
A cross section of media reports has presented the appointment of special interest councillors as a 
controversial practice that has led to a deterioration of relations between the MLGRUD and most urban 
councils5 as well as between residents and the MLGRUD. 6  Both residents and elected councils have been 
angered by the fact that while many elected councillors have either been suspended and/or dismissed,7 no such 
action has been taken against appointed special interest councillo rs. The media reports have also noted that 
most local councils view the appointment of such councillors by the MLGRUD as abuse of power by the 
Minister with some threatening to take legal action 8. Other media reports have expressed the view that the 
Minister’s powers be reduced.9 Precious Shumba has acknowledged that special interest councillors may help 
to enrich debates in local councils. However he has noted that currently special interest councillors are a 
liab ility to most local councils that do not have the resources to accommodate such appointments.10 The 
Combined Harare Residents’ Association (CHRA) has expressed the need for local government reforms 10as a 
way of strengthening local democracy, while the Harare Residents’ Trust has equally expressed concerns with 
the way the Minister has been making these appointments.11All the media reports have roundly expressed 
criticis m of the ministerial powers to appoint special interest councillors with the Media Institute of Southern 
Africa (MISA) suggesting that the Minister’s ‘wings be clipped’.12  This paper seeks to provide a critical 
analysis of such appointments given that most media reports have gone as far as expressing opposition to such 
appointments without providing a critical analysis of the practice.  
ESTABLIS HING A NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR LOCAL DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE 
Local governance is guided by a series of instruments both at international and regional levels. It  is from these 
instruments that countries derive their respective national instruments to govern local government.In seeking 
to provide a normative framework for local democratic governance, it is imperat ive that international, regional 
and Zimbabwean legislative instruments are used. For this paper, a cursory examination of different local 
governance instruments are utilised to put in place a normative framework on which to compare with the 
                                                 
3 Veritas (2010) Urban Councils to get special interest councilors-Bill Watch 15/2010. 
4 S4A (2), Urban Councils’ Act (2008). 
5 “Chombo Risks Lawsuit” in Zimbabwe Daily News, May 23, 2010; CHRA,  2012- Brian James suspension 
Exposes Urgent Need for Local Government Reform!. 
6 SibandaA‘Bulawayo residents and Chombo to clash over special interest councillors’Bulawayo24, 19 May 2012. 
7 Chombo has of January 2012 suspended a total of four MDC councilors in Harare for corruption. These were five 
in Rusape, one in Nyaminyami Rural District Council; two in Zvimba Rural District Council; and two in Harare 
Municipality – Councillors  Warship Dumba and Casper Takura who had opened a council probe on the  minister on 
how he had acquired so many properties in Harare, Brian James  becomes the latest victim. 
8 Staff Reporter ‘Chombo Risks Lawsuit’ in Zimbabwe Daily News, 23 May 2010. 
9 MISA “Residents wants Chombo's powers clipped” Human Rights-The Zimbabwean, 18 September 2010. 10 
Shumba P ‘Special Interest councillors ideal but not necessary’SW Africa Radio, 17 SW Africa Radio, 26 March 
2012. 
10 CHRA,‘Brian James suspension Exposes Urgent Need for Local Government Reform!’. 
11 Harare Residents Trust. ‘Chitungwiza Residents raise concerns with Minister Chombo’SW Africa 
Radio, 13 February 2012.  
12 MISA ‘Residents wants Chombo's powers clipped’The Zimbabwean, 18 September 2010.  
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practice of appointing special interest councillors in Zimbabwe. By using the critical features of democratic 
governance extrapolated from the instruments, the author will be able to provide a crit ical analysis of section 
4A of the Urban Councils Act which empowers the Minister of Local Government Rural and Urban 
Development (MLGRUD) to appoint special interest councillors.  
At international levels, there are several instruments that govern the administration of democracy local 
governance. However, for this paper, the United nations-Habitat Urban Governance and the United Cities and 
Local Governments (UCLG) are discussed, given that they provide a global normative framework.  The 
United Nations-Habitat Urban Governance Index (UGI) is an advocacy and capacity-building tool that assists 
urban councils and countries in monitoring the quality of urban governance.The UGI provides a blueprint for 
good urban governance practices in urban areas across the globe and is anchored in its desire to promote 
participatory local governance in urban areas including participatory budgeting. The UGI puts emphasis on 
participation as a vital component of democrat ic governance. Participation in local governance should be 
through election of councillors by residents. The objectives of the UGI are ‘to demonstrate the importance of 
good urban governance in achieving b road development objectives’ at  global level, and at local level ‘to 
catalyse local action to improve the quality of urban governance by developing indicators that respond directly 
to their unique contexts and needs’ 13  and to contribute to the strengthening and improving of urban 
governance.14 
The UGI is complemented by the United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG) which comprises the largest 
local government forum in the world  that brings together different towns and cities across the globe. The 
UCLG provides a forum for setting norms and standards for the promotion of local democracy, self-
government and decentralization. In addition, UCLG helps in mapping ways of fostering accountable and 
transparent local governance through forging linkages between communit ies and NGOs. The UCLG 
Committee on Social Inclusion, Part icipatory Democracy and Human Rights of the United Cities and Local 
Governments(UCLG)recognises people’s right to social inclusion, participation and to human rights15 as well 
as the importance of local forums as a plat form for informat ion exchange among citizens and local 
authorities.The UCLG’s thrust is on representative democracy  in  which local communit ies are involved in the 
decision making processed of public affairs.  The crit ical features of democracy drawn from the work of the 
Committee on Social Inclusion, Part icipatory Democracy and Human Rights include citizen participation 
through electoral processes; inclusion of marginalised groups in decisionmaking processes; accountable local 
leadership and decentralisation of decision-making powers to local communities.17 
At regional level, a plethora of instruments seek to guide the governance of local government. These include 
The United Cities and Local Governments of Africa (UCLGA); The Charter for Popular Participation in 
Development and Transformation (CPPDT) (1990); the African  
Union Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG) (2012); the All Africa  
Ministerial Conference on Decentralisation (AMCOD); the United Cities and Local Governments of Africa 
(UCLGA); the Victoria Falls Declaration adopted in 1999; the Kigali Declaration of 2006 and the Harare 
Declaration.  
The United Cities and Local Governments of Africa (UCLGA) is a Pan-African forum of African local 
government institutions and seeks to spearhead local government reforms in most African countries and 
democratise local government institutions.16The UCLGA enjoys the recognition of the African Union and 
strives for a united and strong Africa.17The UCLGA seeks to promote democratic principles and institutions, 
popular participation in the processes of governance.18 Most importantly the UCLGA recognises the 
importance of decentralisation of power from central government to local councils and eventually to 
communities.  
                                                 
13 UN-HABITAT-Good Urban Governance  Index ‘Urban Indicators Guidelines: Monitoring the Habitat Agenda and 
the Millennium Development Goals’ (2004b). 
14 UN-HABITAT-Good Urban Governance Index (2004b).  
15 From the work of the Committee on Social Inclusion, Participatory Democracy and Human Rights (2011). 
17Article 9, UCLGA Constitution (2008). 
16 Preamble, UCLGA Constitution (2008). 
17 Preamble, UCLGA Constitution (2008). 
18 Article 4.9, UCLGA (2008). 
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In addition to the two categories of instruments discussed above, there is a plethora of instruments seek to 
guide the governance of local government. These include the Charter for Popular Part icipation in 
Development and Transformation (CPPDT) (1990); the African Union Charter on Democracy, Elections and 
Governance (ACDEG) (2012); the All Africa Ministerial Conference on Decentralisation (AMCOD); the 
Victoria Falls Declaration (1999); the Kigali Declarat ion (2006); Harare Declaration (1999) as well as 
Zimbabwe’s new constitution. It should be noted that most of these instruments are ‘soft laws’ which are 
commitments made by negotiating parties that are not legally binding. ‘Soft laws’ are characterised by the 
relatively large amount of discretion which is left to the parties bound by the obligation.19 However it should 
be noted that although ‘soft laws’ are discretionary in nature, they are not without important legal and polit ical 
effects. They help to promote coexistence and exchange of informat ion among state parties as a way of finding 
common ground on issues of national, reg ional and international importance. As such it can be pointed out 
that soft law instruments are only potentially  binding and can be conceived of as the beginning of a gradual 
process in which further steps are needed to make such agreements binding ru les for states.20 This is the 
premise on which  the instruments that are exp lored for this paper will be regarded.The Charter for Popular 
Participation in Development and Transformation  (CPPDT)is a co llaborative in itiat ive by NGOs, grassroots 
organisations as well as African states. 21  The major objective of the Charter is ‘to sensitise national 
governmentsand theinternational community to the dimensions, dynamics and processesand potential of a 
development approach’ 
The focus of the CDDPT is rooted in adopting a community-centred approach to development and recognises 
the vital importance of a people-based approach to development where communities are part of the 
governance process at all levels and at all times. The CDDPT provides a blueprint on which part icipatory 
democratic principles can be strengthened, including empowering people to make informed political decisions. 
The CPPDT presents popular participation as a fundamental right of the people to fully and effectively 
participate in the determination of the decisions that affect  their lives at all levels and at  all times.22The 
Charter asserts the role of popular part icipation as a determinant and assertive ingredient in  democracy and 
provide a vital cog in the participation continuum and should ‘be fully involved, committed and indeed, seize 
the initiative’.23The Charter urges African governments to provide an enabling environment for citizens to 
freely  participate in  affairs that affect their lives by way of appropriate legislation at d ifferentlevels of 
government ‘to yield. Another instrument, the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance 
(ACDEG)seeks ‘to promote adherence by each State Party to the universal values and principles of democracy 
and respect for human rights premised upon the supremacy of the constitution and constitutional 
order’. 24.Given that the ACDEG is  the latest of African init iative to democratise governance on the continent, 
it stands to contribute to the strengthening of electoral processes. The Charter ‘states the min imum 
requirements for the observance of democrat ic principles and the protection of human rights and effective 
democratic governance in Africa’ 25 . The ACDEG shows commitment to the decentralisation and 
democratisation of local government.The contribution of the ACDEG to local government is that it requires 
state parties to ‘decentralise power to democratically elected local authorities as provided in national laws’.26 
In addition, the Charter reaffirms the importance of free and fair elections and the need for political stability in 
African states.27 As a result the instrument seeks to promote best practices in the management of elections for 
purposes of political stability and good governance.28 
The All Africa Ministerial Conference on Decentralisation (AMCOD) is a manifestation of thegrowing 
realisation and recognition of the importance of local governance has resulted in states making concerted 
efforts and taking in itiatives to promote decentralizat ion through public forums.One such forum is the All 
Africa Min isterial Conference on Decentralisation (AMCOD) which was established in terms of its 
                                                 
19 Grnchalla- Wesiershi T ‘A Framework for Understanding “Soft Law” (2001) McGill Law Journal 30 (37). 
20 Grnchalla- Wesiershi (2001) . 
21 Article (B) (d) and Article (D) (a), Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation (1990). 
22 Article 23 (ii), ACPPDT (1990). 
23 Article 23 (iii), ACPPDT (1990). 
24 Lee R ‘New era for democracy in Africa’ (2012) Open Society for Southern Africa (OSISA). 
25 IDASA (2012) ‘15 Ratifications of the AU Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance’. 
26 Article 34, African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG)(2012). 
27 Article 35, (ACDEG)(2012). 
28 Article 2 (13), ACDEG (2012). 
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constitution. The AMCOD is a permanent ministerial forum where Ministers in  charge of local governance 
map out strategies about enhancing local government structures. Through AMCOD forums Ministers 
responsible for local government in their respective countries deliberate on ways to enhance democratic 
governance and share democratic governance best practices. Most importantly the AMCOD init iated the 
drafting of the African Charter on the Values, Principles and Standards of Decentralisation and Local 
Governance. 29  The AMCOD is a persuasive instrument that provides a platform for ministers of local 
government to make resolutions on ways of strengthening local democracy. The African Union (AU) invites 
the AMCOD to AU meet ings as a way of recognising the concerted effort of African government in enhancing 
local democracy. The AMCOD links decentralisation and local development. 30  In addition, through sub-
regional groups of Min isters responsible for local government, Ministers are able to peer-review each other on 
the extent to which they implement decentralizat ion programmes in their respective countries. Zimbabwe is a 
member of the AMCOD and as such is bound by the resolutions of the Conference. The AMCOD calls upon 
AU member states to enact defined laws that empower local authorities to make decisions that address the 
challenges in the respective constituencies.  The AMCOD Constitution sets out several objectives which 
include ‘to promote decentralisation, local governance and participation of citizens and social groups in 
designing and implementing development policies’.31 
For this paper decentralisation would translate to the empowering of communit ies to make decisions on 
matters that affect their lives and communit ies, is vital for local democracy. The AMCOD does not provide for 
appointment of public officials but points out that leadership should undergo the democratic electoral 
process.34 
Another instrument, The Kigali Declaration (2006) seeks to provide a road map  for decentralisation and the 
empowerment of local communit ies to participate in decision-making processes.32 All the provisions of the 
Kigali Declaration are in the form of ‘soft law’ and as such are persuasive and call upon participants to 
commit themselves to the democratisation of local government through decentralisation in which central 
government cedes power to subnational government level. In addition  the Kigali Declarat ion calls upon states 
to enact: 
legal and institutional frameworks based on clear decentralisation vision containing the effective 
process of decentralisation and legal instruments that determine the pace of commitment to 
decentralisation 33 
Just like the Kigali Declaration, The Victoria Falls Declaration comes in the form of ‘soft law’. The major 
provision of the Victoria Falls Declaration includesdecentralisation and democratisation of the local 
government. The Declaration urges sub-Saharan African governments to enact and adopt legislation that 
provides for decentralisation and devolution of power to promote local democracy.34 
The Victoria Falls Declaration puts emphasis on  the promotion of democracy and good political governance 
and enhance the accountability of public office holders 35by seeking :to devolve power and responsibility to 
lower echelons, promote local democracy and good governance, with the ultimate objective of improving the 
quality of life of the people; 36to be representative of, and accountable to, all sectors of the local population, 
including marginalised and disadvantaged groups;37Inculcate effective community participation in local 
governance;41 
Given that Zimbabwe was part of the group of states that signed the Declaration, it has an obligation to 
recognise the contents of the Declaration. 
                                                 
29 Article 2, AMCOD Constitution (2008). 
30 Article 23, AMCOD Constitution (2008). 
31 Part I (2), AMCOD Constitution (2008). 34Article 17, 
AMCOD (2012). 
32 Preamble, Kigali Declaration on Leadership Capacity Building for Decentralised Governance and Poverty 
Reduction in Sub-Saharan Africa (2005). 
33 Kigali Declaration (2005). 
34 Article 3 (1),Victoria Falls Declaration (1999). 
35 Article 3 (3). 
36 Article 3 (3). 
37 Article 3 (b). 41 
Article 3 (c). 
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The new Constitution of Zimbabwe, commonly known as the Zimbabwe Parliamentary Select Committee 
(COPAC) Constitution, takes cognisance of democratic local governance and provides for decentralisation 
and devolution of powers to local communities.Given that local government in Zimbabwe has been in 
existence since colonization with varying degrees of undemocratic practices, the new constitution holds 
prospects for representative democratic governance. A brief discussion of the COPAC constitution on 
decentralisation and devolution is provided below.38 
THE ZIMBABWE PARLIAMENTARY SELECT COMMITTEE (COPAC) CONSTITUTION  
The COPAC Constitution(herein referred to as ‘the Constitution’) gives a detailed description of local 
government in four sections under the following headings: Devolution of  
Governmental Powers and Responsibilities; 39 Urban Local Authorities; 40 Functions of Local  
Authorities; 41 and Elections and Local Authorities.42 
Devolution of Governmental Powers and Responsibilities  
The provisions on devolution in the Constitution present a first attempt in Zimbabwe to provide 
constitutionally protected powers of local government institutional and legislative frameworks. Under 
devolution, the Constitution exhibits the desire to reform local government by empowering local councils 
and enhance their autonomy. In addit ion, the comprehensive provision of local government in the 
Constitution provides for structures and institutions that should comprise the new local government system 
in the country. In this regard the Constitution provides that: 
governmental powers and responsibilities must be devolved to provinces and metropolitan councils and 
local authorities which are competent to carry out those responsibilities efficiently and effectively.43 
In addition, the Constitution recognises  
“the right of communities to manage their own affairs and to further their development” 44 
The Constitution is different to all constitutional and legislative provisions in the history of the country 
because it recognises the right of communities to contribute to local democracy primarily through the election 
of local council officials. The draft presents local governance as seeking  
“to give powers of local government to the people and enhance their participation in the exercise of 
State powers in making decisions that affect their lives”45. 
No other legislative or constitutional framework in the constitutional history of Zimbabwe ever provided for 
the ceding of State powers to communities and the incorporating of communities in the decision-making 
processes through electing local leadership. The Constitution recognises the importance of devolution by 
empowering local councils and local communities through the 
“transfer [of] responsibilities and resources from national government in order to establish a sound 
financial base for each provincial and metropolitan and local authority”46 
Urban Local Authorities  
The Constitution makes specific reference to urban local governance and provides the primary purpose of 
urban local councils as seeking “to represent and manage the affairs of people in urban areas”.47In addition, 
the provision recognises the importance of elected councillors in the management of urban council affairs by 
stating that 
“urban local authorities are managed by councils composed of councillors elected by registered voters in the 
areas concerned”52 
This provision does not make any reference to the appointment of councillors by local communities or 
councils. This provision reaffirms the need for community participation in the election of local leadership. 
Functions of Local Authorities  
                                                 
38 S14.11, COPAC draft (2012). 
39 S 14.1COPAC draft (July 2012). 
40 S 14.11, COPAC draft (July 2012). 
41 S 14.13, COPAC draft (July 2012). 
42 S 14.14, COPAC draft (July 2012). 
43 S14.1 (1) COPAC draft (July 2012). 
44 S14.1 (2) (d) COPAC draft (July 2012). 
45 S14.1 (2) (a) COPAC draft (July 2012). 
46 S14.1 (1) (2) (f) (2012). 
47 S14.11 (1) COPAC draft. 52 
S14.11 (2) . 
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This is one of the most important provisions of the Constitution with regard to the establishment of 
autonomous local councils. The draft provides for the creation of autonomous local councils that  
“[have] the right to govern on [their]own in itiat ive, the local affairs of the people within  the area for 
which [they have]been established, and shall have all the powers necessary for [them] to do so”48 
The provision is confirmation that the Constitution recognises the importance of autonomy  
of local authorities. In addition this provision recognises and acknowledges the importance of investing power 
in local authorities to represent their interests. In addition the draft recognises that locally-elected leadership 
understands community needs although in reality this might not be the case. The draft does not make 
provision for the appointment of councillors local by communities. 
Elections and Local Authorities 
The Constitution recognises the importance of locally-elected councillors in local councils and stipulates when 
(and how) as well as under what circumstances these should be elected into office.49The draft reaffirms the 
view that councils should be established for every locality and that the respective communities should be 
responsible for the election of local council officials to administer the affairs of the communities.50 The 
Constitution also recognises the fact that mayors should be appointed by those councillors elected to represent 
different wards in council. 51 
EXTRAPOLATING ELEMENTS OF DEMOCRATIC URBAN GOVERNANCE 
The different legislative instruments that were exp lored above have all y ielded several elements of democratic 
governance. The most salient and dominant elements of democratic urban governance that have frequently 
dominated the stipulations of different instruments is that democratic urban governance should be 
characterised by community participation in the operations and decision-making processes of local councils. 
Community part icipation would come in the fo rm of consulting residents in such important issues as 
budgetary processes and coming up with citizen charters where the role of citizens in urban governance is 
made clear. Communities can also participate in the administration of local councils through election of 
councillors to represent their needs. In addition the different instruments have cited decentralisation of 
decision-making processes from the centre to localit ies. Given that local government is closer to communit ies, 
it is best positioned to understand the challenges of residents and to work closely with such communities in 
finding long-lasting solutions. 
Local  democracy has also been indicated as creating an enabling environment where local communities are 
able to choose/elect local leaders without interference from the centre. The different instruments have also 
agreed on the need for res ponsiveness on the part of local councils which must respond to the needs of the 
residents. Different residents have different needs and the centre cannot provide a strait-jacket set of 
regulatory framework to govern all urban councils without leaving a leeway for independent decision-
making.As a result local autonomy is a requirement for urban democratic governance where local 
communit ies are given the opportunity to exercise their right to choose their leadership and make independent 
decisions without interference from the centre.Closely associated with decentralizat ion is the practice of 
devolution in which local councils are empowered to enhance their autonomy.The provisions on devolution in 
the COPAC draft present a first attempt in Zimbabwe to provide constitutionally protected powers of local 
government institutional and legislative frameworks. Devolution provides the opportunity to transfer powers 
from central government to local communit ies.  Trans parency in the operations of local councils, in 
budgetary processes and in the appointment of local officials is vital in urban governance if trust is to be 
earned from residents. In addition, elected councillors should be accountable to residents whose needs the 
councillors should seek to address.Cooperation between levels of government is also encouraged in different 
instruments as a prerequisite for democratic governance. 
The COPAC exh ibits elements of democratic governance, providing for the election of local councillors as 
well as mayors and other public office bearers. The COPAC draft also recognises the role of communit ies in 
determining the choice of local leadership. The draft also recognises the significance of elect ions and elected 
leadership. Most importantly devolution is provided for as acknowledgement transfer of power and functions 
should help to facilitate participation of communities in decision making processes with limited central 
government intervention. 
                                                 
48 S14.113 (1) . 
49 S14.14 (1) COPAC draft. 
50 S14.14 (2) . 
51 S14.14 (2) (a). 
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PROVISIONS OF SECTION 4A OF THE URBAN COUNCILS’ ACT  
The amended section 4A of the Urban Councils Act is made up of three sub-sections. It stipulates the quota of 
appointed special interest councillors in each urban local council. The legislation also determines how the 
incumbents should relate to the MLGRUD. In  addition the legislat ion provides the benefits that should accrue 
to the incumbents in their capacity as councillo rs, although they do not vote. Below is the fu ll provision of 
section 4 A of the Urban Councils Act: 
Subject to this Act, every municipal and town council shall consist of-   
(1) (a) One elected councillor for each ward of the council area; and 
(b)Such number o f appointed councillors representing special interests, not exceeding onequarter of the 
number of elected councillors, as the Minister may fix in respect of the council by statutory  instrument, and 
who shall hold office during the pleasure of the Minister 
(2)Appointed councillors shall part icipate in the business of the municipal or town council to which they are 
appointed and perform the same functions and be entitled to the same benefits in every  respect as if they were 
elected councillors, except that they shall not have a vote at meetings of the municipal or town council 
concerned. 
Unpacking section 4A of the Urban Councils’Act 
In this section the author unpacks the implementation of the legislation and how it resonates with 
representative democracy. In the d iscussion of the legislation, the author highlights elements such as deciding 
on the numbers to be appointed and elected; selecting candidates for appointment based on interest; deciding 
on tenure of incumbents; and status of appointed special interest councillors.  
Deciding on the Numbers  
Section 4A (1) (a) provides for the election of at least one ward councillor for each ward. Th is is in line with 
representative democracy where residents are able to elect local leadership of their choice. Th is section also 
recognises the right of residents to elect leaders of their own choice. In this section there is no evident 
influence of the MLGRUD in  the election of councillors, or if such influence is there, it  is limited. Such 
election of local councillors is leg itimate as it is (or should be) done in terms of the Zimbabwe Electoral Act.52 
This in turn stipulates the number of councillors to be elected fo r each ward. Th is section of the Act is thus 
important in that it sets the foundation on which the number of special interest councillors will be based. 
However the Min ister may deviate by going over the 25% threshold since he/she is empowered to fix the 
number of those individuals that may be appointed as special interest councillors.53 Once the councillors are 
elected, the Minister would then appoint more than 25% of elected councillors.54 This means that the higher 
the number of elected councillo rs in a constituency, the higher the possible number of appointed special 
interest councillors. This element of discretion on the part of the Min ister to fix the number of appointed 
councillors could be the reason for different numbers of appointed special councillors in urban councils with 
the same number of elected councillors. It is left  to the Minister to determine the number of special interest 
councillors not exceeding one quarter of the elected councillors. This means that the Minister may decide to 
appoint less or an equivalent of a quarter of those elected to council. More details in this regard are presented 
under paragraph 3.4.2 the survey of 20 urban  councils which shows different numbers of appointed special 
interest councillors in different local councils.  
Selecting candidates based on expertise 
Section 4A (1) (b) calls upon the MLGRUD to make the necessary appointment of individuals with the special 
skills (and in some cases with relevant expertise as with former mayors). A lthough section 4A (1) (b) 
mandates the MLGRUD to make the appointments, it does not provide guidelines or criteria and the process of 
appointing councillors is left at the discretion of the Minister. However pract ice has shown that the common 
fields that have been considered as special interest areas include skills and expertise (experience) in education, 
health, the disabled, women and other fields that the Minister may from t ime to time identify. In addition, the 
legislation does not provide for ways to determine the level o f skills and/or expert ise of the appointees. This 
means that the Minister mayappoint anybody as long as according to the Minister’s judgment, the individual is 
suitable. Thus it is the Minister who makes the final decision without being restrained by any statutory criteria. 
Thus also there is no guarantee that the appointed special interest councillors indeed possess the required 
expertise or indeed represent special interests.  
Deciding on the length of the tenure 
                                                 
52 Article 23 (1), Zimbabwe Electoral Act (2006). 
53 S 4 A (2), Urban Councils Act. 
54 S 4 A (2), Urban Councils Act. 
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In addition to providing for the selection of candidates for appointment as special interest councillors, section 
4A (1) (b) also decides on the length of tenure of the appointees. The appointed councillors shall hold office 
during the pleasure of the Minister.55 This means that they may operate as long as the Minister wants them to 
and can be dismissed or have their tenure renewed, whether they are performing well or not. The fate of 
special interest councillors is thus in the hands of the Minister to retain or dismiss them.  
Status of the appointed special interest councillors 
Section 4A (2) empowers the appointed special interest councillors to take part in municipal business and to 
perform the same functions as their elected counterparts. The appointees receive the same benefits as their 
elected counterparts, with their salaries being paid by the local authority and not by the Minister. However the 
major difference between appointed and elected councillors is that of voting rights. While elected councillors 
can vote, appointed special interest councillors do not have the right to vote. Despite the fact that the 
appointed special interest councillors have no voting rights, they are influential in terms of providing expertise 
and skills. In addition, appointed councillors enjoy the personal recognition of the Minister unlike the elected 
councillors who are chosen by the local communities. Therefore they can be regarded as vital to the 
implementation of policy in local councils due to their expertise and skills in local government. 
SURVEY OF 20 MAJOR URBAN COUNCILS 
In order to establish the extent to which the appointment of special interest councillors in terms of section 4 A 
of the Urban Councils’ Act presents democratic urban governance, the author carried out a survey of 20 major 
urban councilsshowing the total number of elected councillors, their appointed counterparts, political 
affiliation, gender as well as the expertise/skill on whose basis they have been appointed into council. 
City/Town 
   Gender Party affiliation 
Skill/expertise 
  
M F ZANU MDC 
 
Bulawayo 29 7 7 - 7 - All  rejected by residents 25% 
Chinhoyi 15 1 - 1 1 - unconfirmed 7% 
Gweru 18 4 4 - 4 - res ass, disabled, 
commerce, educ 
22% 
Kadoma 17 4 1 3 4 - 1 former mayor(m) 
3females- med doc educ, 
media  
24% 
Kwekwe 14 0 0 0 0 0 No appointments  - 
Marondera 12 3 2 1 3 - Former mayor, dep. 
mayor, finance chair 
25% 
Mutare 18 4 4 0 4 0 Legal,finance,admin 22% 
Redcliff 9 2 2 0 2 0 Business, artisan 22% 
Shurugwi 13 0 0 0 0 0 No appointments 0% 
Vic Falls 11 1 1 0 0 1 business 9% 
Harare 46 11 9 2 11 0 1 disabled,1 res ass, 1 bus, 
8 former cllrs 
24% 
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Gwanda 11 2 2 0 2 0 Business, former cllr 18% 
Kariba 9 1 1 0 1 0 Former mayor 11% 
Karoi 10 3 2 1 3 0 Former mayors 30% 
Zvishavane 12 2 1 1 2 0 Business,former myr 17% 
Masvingo 17 3 2 1 3 0 Disabled, bus,educ  
Rusape 13 2 1 1 1 1 Former cllr,educ 15% 
Chegutu 15 1 1 0 1 0 Former mayor 7% 
Bindura 8 2 2 0 2 0 Former cllrs 25% 
Chitungwiz a 23 4 4 0 4 0 Bus, former myr, 2 former 
cllrs 
17% 
TOTAL 320 57 4 
6 
11 55 2 44 skills/expertise 18% 
JUSTIFICATION FOR THE ENACTMENT OF SECTION 4 A OF THE URBAN COUNCILS ACT 
It can be noted that section 4A (2) brings up questions of the desirability of special interest councillors given 
that they are non-elected indiv iduals, enjoying similar benefits as their elected counterparts. It has been argued 
that their presence can be important because they contribute to debates in councils and help influence policy 
towards specific interest groups. By v irtue of their experience and expert ise, special interest councillors are 
necessary to retain continuity of council business after the election of new and inexperienced MDC 
councillors.56 It can be noted that there are several justifications for the enactment of section 4A of the Urban 
Councils Act. The justificat ion for appointing special interest councillors using the practice as a way of 
promoting multi-party democracy, as a bulwark against corruption or as a partisan practice by a dominant 
political party. On the other hands there are political reasons for appointing special interest councillors in 
urban councils. The two positions will be discussed under separate headings, namely ‘o fficial policy  position’ 
and ‘political reasons’. 
OFFICIAL POLICY POSITION 
The argument under the official position was that since most of the elected MDC councillors are still 
inexperienced in local governance, they needed to work alongside experienced former councillors, hence the 
need to incorporate experienced councilors mostly from ZANU PF. It should be noted that only ZANU PF 
held the position of councilors in  most local councils because it was the only  dominant political party with no 
challenges to its rule until 2000 with the participation of the MDC in  local government elections. The 
existence of inexperienced councillors mostly from the MDC justified the need to appoint special interest 
councillors. 
Need for expertise in local council 
During the enactment of section 4A of the Urban Councils Act it was argued that the appointment of special 
interest councillors would help to integrate experienced councillors and other civic leaders into local councils 
to strengthen and promote balanced debate. It was envisaged that such experienced councillors and civic 
leaders would draw from their years of exposure to local council business. The experience of the appointed 
councillors would  be of help  to the elected MDC councillors most of whom did not have any prior local 
government experience. Therefore in order to have continuity in local council business the appointment of 
experienced councillo rs, mostly ZANU PF candidates who had lost in local government elections was 
justified.57 
Promoting multi-party democracy 
                                                 
56 Shumba P (2012) 2. 
57 Grabmore G‘Ignorance Chombo's primary aim is to frustrate MDC councils’ New Zimbabwe Forums,18 May 
2012.  
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It was argued that confining the composition of local councils to elected councillors would limit  the 
composition of most local councils to MDC councillors who are usually the preferred polit ical party, 
especially in urban areas. Therefore finding alternative ways of opening up the composition of local councils 
through incorporating other political part ies and constituencies without passing through the voting process 
would enable more voices in local councils. 58  Incorporating different social groups would give voice to 
different sections of the local community. Despite the fact that the MDC party had won in most urban 
councils, but the incorporation of individuals from other political part ies would facilitate the cross fertilisation 
of ideas in local councils and a culture of tolerance among different political parties. It was envisaged that 
having one political party in council would not be in the spirit of multi-party democracy. The appointment of 
special interest councillo rs coming from different political, social and economic backgrounds would not only 
enrich the debates and expertise within local councils, but would also promote mult i-party democracy.59 In 
addition, the appointment of different social interest groups within local councils would ensure representation 
of different social groups. Bringing in  specific groups such as women, the disabled and youth would ensure 
the representation of their interest in local government policy formulation and implementation. Appointing 
special interest councillors for these and other groups would also enable local councils to make informed 
policy decisions that serve the interests of different groups.  
Bulwark against corruption and protection of residents  
It was argued that special interest councillors were appointed to provide checks and balances on the 
performance and activities of elected councillors from the same polit ical parties who might want to engage in 
corrupt practices.60 
There were also claims by the MLGRUD that the enactment and subsequent implementation of section 4A 
was necessitated by central government’s desire to protect residents from unscrupulous councillo rs. The 
MLGRUD justified the intervention in local councils as seeking to ‘protect residents’ from the excesses of 
inexperienced MDC councillors.61 This is the o fficial version of what the Minister p resents as the justification 
for making additional appointments to urban councils that are dominated by the MDC councillors elected in 
their respective wards.67However despite the official rat ionale for the appointment of special interest 
councillors, there are those who view such appointments as being done for political reasons.  
POLITICAL REASONS 
Apart from the official  policy position which states that experienced former councillors should be appointed 
by the Minister as a way of inserting expertise and skills, there is also another position (herein  the polit ical 
position) which argues that in enacting section 4A and appointing special interest councillors, the MLGRUD 
has political motives as discussed below.  
Capitalising on the inexperience of the MDC in local governance to enact the piece of legislation 
One of the most puzzling issues is how the MDC could have allowed the enactment of Section 4 A when it  
was evident that it not only empowered the MLGRUD but that it would be used to frustrate the MDC elected 
councillors. There are possibilities that the euphoria of prospects of winn ing all electoral processes in the 
election which were to be help in 2008 overwhelmed the MDC legislators to the extent that they saw no need 
to delay the amendment of the Urban Councils Act. It could also be that the lack of local government 
experience and the meaning and impact of local government legislation could have contributed to this 
oversight on the part of the MDC. In 2006 when section 4A first became operational in urban local councils, 
ZANU PF had been in government for over 26 years while the MDC had never been in government as a sole 
party. As such it lacked government experience and tended to take things for granted, including the possible 
impact of section 4 A on the operations of urban local councils dominated by the MDC.  
Using the appointed special interest councillors as spies for the MLGRUD 
Given that most councillors in both urban and rural councils are from the MDC the Minister may have sought, 
through appointed special interest councillo rs, to gather information on what would be going on in urban 
councils. With different polit ical parties in local councils as well as experts in different fields, these 
councillors would also check on each other’s performances and such practice would most likely limit corrupt 
tendencies. It may be that the MLGRUD have used the appointment of special interest councillors to gather 
                                                 
58 Shumba, P (2012) 3. 
59 Madhekeni G (2012) 23. 
60 Harare Residents Trust (2012) 2. 
61 This is expressed in the following newspaper report: Chombo has justified his meddling, insisting that he is 
protecting residents from the excesses of corrupt local authorities – most of which are run by the MDC-T. 67 Staff 
Reporter ‘Mangwana raps 'undemocratic' Chombo’’ New Zimbabwe, 25 August 2012. 
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intelligence on the proceedings in urban local councils.62 This argument has been expressed by the media as 
the major reason behind the suspension and dismissal of MDC councillo rs on the pretext that there are either 
corrupt or incompetent. It would only be through some of the councillors in councils that the Minister would 
be knowledgeable about deliberat ions in local councils. As a result appointed special interest councillors could 
be the most likely source of information for the Minister for him to be able to decide who to suspend and 
eventually dis miss for ‘maladmin istration’ or ‘mis management’ subjective terms which cannot be 
quantified.63 
Appointment of special interest councillors as a vindication of oppositional politics  
The appointment of special interest councillors in  terms of section 4A  of the Urban Councils Act has 
encountered much opposition from residents in many urban areas.70 The appointment has also attracted public 
attention, especially  through the media which  has highlighted the plight of urban councils most of which have 
failed to contend with additional unelected personnel on their payrolls. There has also been a claim that the 
process of appointing special interest councillors may  be or that it is being abused.64  What has further 
exacerbated this situation is the fact that there is no legal p rovision to check the powers of the Min ister, 
leaving room for the manipulation of the powers to appoint.65Since the enactment of section 4A of the Urban 
Councils Act (UCA) in April 2008, numerous elected councillors and mayors belonging to the MDC have 
been dismissed, or summarily suspended pending dismissal to justify the appointment of special interest 
councillors over and above elected councillo rs. At the same t ime the Minister seeks to discredit the Movement 
for Democratic Change (MDC) councillors as incompetent to gain political mileage for the Zimbabwe African 
National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU PF).73 The rampant dismissal and suspension of MDC-T (the MDC 
faction led by Mr Morgan Tsvangirai) councillo rs and mayors and dissolving urban councils has led to 
allegations that the Minister seeks to weaken MDC in urban local councils and to justify the existence of 
special interest councillors in urban councils. By highlighting and examining the implications of these 
appointments on urban governance and the general functioning of urban local councils, the author will be able 
to assess the practice of appointing special interest councillors against internationally accepted norms. 
Using the appointment of special interest councillors as a way of discrediting the MDC 
In addition to using special interest councillors to gather intelligence the paper has also noted that the 
appointment of special interest councillors could mostly be used to discredit the MDC which dominate most 
urban local councils. The dominance of the MLGRUD in local council decision-making processes and 
operations of all local authorities could have been used to frustrate the efforts of elected MDC councillo rs in 
their endeavours to execute projects in their constituencies and subsequently curry favour with residents and 
eventually put the name of their political party-ZANU PF in good public standing. As a result of rampant 
suspension and dismissal of elected MDC councillors, many projects have not been completed. The 
deterioration of services against the backdrop of the regular suspension of elected councillors has portrayed 
the MDC elected councillors as incompetent and accuses them of being unsuitable to hold public office. By 
such behaviour, the MLGRUD seeks to weaken the MDC as a political party and discredit  elected MDC 
councillors. 
The fact that the Minister does not appoint special interest councilors in some urban councils such as in 
Kwekwe and Chinhoyi could  be that there is no provision that sets timeframes for such appointments to be 
made. Th is lack o f a timeframe calling upon the Minister to make the appointment of special interest 
councillors could lead to hasty appointment of individuals with no expertise to offer. 
TESTING THE PRACTICE OF APPOINTING COUNCILLORS AGAINST ACCEPTABLE 
DEMOCRATIC STANDARDS 
Different international instruments and the COPAC draft have been explored to extrapolate critical features of 
representative governance. The exploration of different international instruments and the COPAC draft have 
                                                 
62 The Elected Councillors’ Association of Zimbabwe(ECAZ) ‘Chombo uses councilors as spies’ The Zimbabwean, 
7 August 2012.  
63 Media reports have highlighted that there has been regular suspension and subsequent dismissal of MDC elected 
councillors as mayors as cited by the Combined Harare Residents’ Association (see Shumba 2012:2). 
70SibandaA‘Bulawayo residents and Chombo to clash over special interest councilors’Bulawayo24, 16 May 2012. 
64 Harare Residents Trust.’Chitungwiza Residents raise concerns with Minister Chombo’SW Africa Radio, 
13 February 2012. 
65 ‘Bulawayo: Chombo Tries (again) to impose “Special Interest’ Councillors’” Zimbabwe Metro24 April 2012. 73 
Ndlovu N ‘Zimbabwe: Special Interest Councilors Dismissed’The Standard, 14 April 2012. 
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led to the extrapolation of critical values which will be used in this section to establish the extent to which 
section 4 A complies with the requirements of representative democratic governance. The analysis and 
comparison of section 4 A to critical elements of representative governance will be guided by values 
extrapolated from international instruments and the COPAC draft. The values are devolution and limits to 
central interference in which the discussion will be centred on the extent to which in the practice and 
implementation of section 4 A, there has been devolution. In addition the analysis will seek to establish 
whether there has been a restraint on limiting central interference. Other elements that will be used to compare 
section 4 A to international instruments and COPAC draft are the level of representative democracy, 
transparency, participation and accountability in the practice that have been achieved in the practice and 
implementation of section 4 A. In addition the paper seeks to establish whether the appointment of special 
interest councillors contributes to efficiency and effectiveness in local council operations and whether the 
practice is able to accommodate special interest and equity. In addition, the analysis will also seek to establish 
whether there is cooperation between levels of government. 
Devolution and limited central government interference 
This section seeks to establish the extent to which the practice and implementation of section 4 A exhibits 
devolution of functions to local authorities. Devolution and decentralisation featured because both concepts 
call for the transfer of powers to sub-national levels for communities to make autonomous decision in line 
with the needs of localities.66 It has been argued that the major reason for devolution of governmental powers 
and responsibilities to lower levels of government is to empower them to make decisions that affect that their 
communities and to enhance efficiency and effectiveness.75 Devolution helps in limiting central government 
interference and at the same time transferring functions to local communities.  
In terms of section of 4A of the Urban Councils Act central government does not transfer power to 
communities to make appointments. While it can be acknowledged that central government has decentralised 
government functions to sub-national levels the Minister continues to appoint special interest councillors. 
Through legislative powers, the Minister can make additional appointments to all urban councils. The COPAC 
draft, assumes that devolution and decentralisation form the basis for local government and are the central 
themes that inform provincial and local council governance.67 While it can be acknowledged that section 4 A 
of the Urban Councils Act seeks to enhance capacity within local councils by incorporating expertise, it 
compromises devolution of power to sub-national level.  
The reason why the Minister does not consult local councils or communities is that from the way section 4A 
was enacted and how it has been implemented, it is evident that it was never intended to devolve power to 
lower levels of government. The legislation focuses on the Ministerial powers to intervene in local council 
affairs. The legislation therefore compromises devolution as it does not seek to consider input from local 
councils or communities. This failure to devolve power within section 4A enhances central government role in 
local council affairs. As a result, central government exercises unlimited interference in local council affairs. 
The legal framework and practice do not provide a restraint on central government interference in line with the 
principle of devolution. From the manner in which section 4 A is being implemented, it does not suggest that 
this principle of devolution is being respected. 
It has also been noted in the table of special interest councillors above that the Minister may even decide not 
to make any appointments as is the case with the Kwekwe City Council and Shurugwi Town Council. In the 
case of determining how many individuals should be appointed as special interest councillors, the Minister 
makes the final decision. In addition it has also been observed that there is inconsistencies the appointments 
because in some cities the appointments are more than the 25% threshold, (Karoi 30%), while in other areas 
the appointments are less than the thresh hold (Chinhoyi, Chitungwiza, Kariba and Victoria Falls). In other 
towns the appointments comply with the 25% thresh hold (Bindura, Harare and Marondera). It is evident that 
the Minister acts subjectively in the implementing section 4A appointments and thus as an instrument of 
control which translates to lack of devolution. 
Local democracy 
The elements drawn from the international instruments and the COPAC draft are representative, participation, 
transparency and accountability. In line with the requirements of different instruments and from practice, local 
democracy requires that communities elect or appoint leaders to represent their interests in government. At 
local government level, local communities should be involved in electing local leadership. The process of 
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electing leadership should ensure that there is representivity, that the process enables participation of different 
people in the community, that there is transparency in the electoral process or the way the leaders are chosen 
or appointed and that the elected or appointed leaders are accountable to the community.  
Representative democracy 
In the case ofsection 4A of the Urban Councils Act the appointed special interest councillors are accountable 
to the MLGRUD and do not represent the interests of local communities. As such the practice of appointing 
special interest councillors falls short of representative democratic governance requirements which require 
public officials to be elected by their communities to represent the affairs of the communities. It can be argued 
that the fact that only 2 special interest councillors belong to the MDC, representing about 4% of appointed 
councillors indicates that the practice of appointing special interest councillors does not appear to promote 
political pluralism.In addition,there is no evidence to suggest that appointed councillors are democratically 
elected or that they represent different political parties or different constituencies. In addition out of the 57 
special interest councillors appointed by the Minister, only 2 special interest councillors are from the MDC 
while the other 56 belong to ZANU PF as shown on the table above. Therefore the appointed councillors 
cannot be regarded as somehow representing democratic leadership. While it is acknowledged that special 
interest councillors are proportionally elected representatives, the fact that some of them have been rejected by 
residents (as shown by the case of Bulawayo), implies that the practice is unpopular with residents. This is 
further confirmed by negative media report which castigates the practice and implementation of section 4 by 
the Minister. In the case of section 4A the special interest councillors do not originate from people’s choices 
and do not represent a confirmed constituency. In the appointment of special interest councillors in terms of 
section 4A residents are not consulted and the exclusion of residents in determining who should be appointed 
to administer their affairs does not comply with the requirements of representative democracy.  The 
councillors are therefore not a representation of local interests but represent the interests of the Minister who 
appointed them.  
Community Participation 
The principle of participation emerged as a critical feature of democratic governance. Effective participation 
of citizens in democratic and development processes and in governance in public affairs helps to strengthen 
democratic institutions.68 In representative democratic governance, citizens should be involved in all decision-
making processes that affect citizens’ lives.  Evidence has shown that, the appointment of special interest 
councillors has been done by the Minister without and public consultation since the legislation instructing the 
appointment of special interest councillors does not provide for the transfer of powers to communities to 
participate in the appointment of such councillors.   
However, in the practice and implementation of section 4 A, the MLGRUD is not required to seek their 
opinion in this regard. There is no provision calling on the MLGRUD to interact with residents. It would be 
argued that this piece of legislation does not conform to the requirements of participatory or representative 
democracy as it adopts a non-participatory approach to the appointment of special interest councillors in urban 
areas. It can be noted that this piece of legislation falls short of the principle of representative and 
participatory. The picture created by the table above suggests that the implementation of section 4 A does not 
suggest that residents should be part of the appointment process, especially given that residents rejected the 
very candidates who were eventually appointed by the Minister.  
Transparency 
Transparency has been identified as an important aspect of democratic decision making.  
Transparency refers to clarity and fairness in the management of public affairs.69Transparency in the election 
of political leadership forms the basis for a representative democracy 70 as it enhances legitimacy of elected 
leadership. Without transparency, decisions risk being rejected by the citizens as is the case of the seven 
special interest councillors appointed in Bulawayo (see table above). In the case of appointing special interest 
councillors in terms of section 4A there is no transparency about how special interest councillors are 
appointed by the MLGRUD. The fact that there are no criteria to guide the Minister in making the 
appointments has led to lack of transparency. In stipulating the appointment of special interest councillors, the 
law assumes that the Minister will appoint people with the required skills, experience and/or expertise. The 
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lack of guidance may result in anybody being appointed as special interest councillor. As a result, the practice 
has become shrouded in mystery. These shortfalls make the procedure of appointing special interest 
councillors in terms of section 4A flawed since the practice lacks transparency. In addition the constituencies 
of the special interest councillors are subjective in the opinion of the Minister; hence some are not adequately 
represented while others like the business sectors are adequately represented. In addition, some special interest 
areas are not clearly defined such the education sector. Going by how section 4 A is currently being 
implemented, as well as by the results of the survey; it can be argued that the value of transparency is not 
being observed. 
Accountability  
Accountable governance demands that public officials should be answerable to the public in the management 
of public affairs. Accountability of public officials should be directed at those who elected them into public 
office. Accountability to local communities provides checks and balances on public officials. Local 
councillors are elected into office through the electoral process and in accordance with existing electoral 
laws.80 As such the elected councillors strive to serve their local councils. Through the appointments of special 
interest councilors, the MLGRUD is able to monitor performance of public officials. As a result local 
leadership should be accountable to local communities. 
Section 4A is precise as to whom the appointed special interest councillors are accountable to. The fact that 
the special interest councillors “hold office at the pleasure of the Minister”71implies that they operate at the 
behest of the Minister who may dismiss them at any time. Given that the appointed special interest councillors 
are accountable to the Minister, it suggests that they serve the interests of the Minister. The appointment of 
special interest councillors in terms of section 4A put the elected councillors in a position where they are 
accountable to the Minister despite holding public office. Given that special interest councillors are public 
officials, it is reasonable to assume that they should be accountable to the public. However this is not the case 
as they are accountable to the MLGRUD. 
Following from the language of section 4 A, whoever is appointed is the Minister’s personal preference and as 
such should be accountable to the Minister. It is also worth noting that the tenure of those appointed as special 
interest councillors is decided by the Minister who may decide to renew their appointment, dismiss or suspend 
the incumbents. The Minister thus determines their working conditions. The legislation and practice of 
appointing special interest councillors compromises the accountability of special interest councillors to the 
public or their respective local councils. Therefore the law and practice of section 4 A does not suggest that 
the value of accountability is being respected. 
Accommodating special interests/equity 
Inclusiveness ensures the representation of all social groups in the community and contributes to local 
democracy. Inclusiveness also helps in mobilising different groups in the community. Equity has been used 
interchangeably with inclusiveness in most instruments. Equity enables the representation of different social 
groups on an equal basis irrespective of their social status and gender.72 Out of a cumulative total of 57 special 
interest councillors for 18 urban local councils, only 8 are women. This is a far cry from the provisions of 
major instruments which call for gender balance and equality in governance and development processes.73 
The appointment of special interest councilors is one way of achieving equity. In appointing special interest 
councillors in terms of section 4A there is no evidence that the Minister considers appointing individuals 
representing different political, economic and social sectors.  
The incorporation of appointed special interest councillors, mostly from ZANU PF, does not really add to 
pluralism and renders the composition of local councils inadequate in terms of incorporation of other political 
parties or interests other than those presented on the table above. In principle the inclusion of special interest 
councillors could facilitate the accommodation of a variety of interests, particularly those of vulnerable groups 
such as the disabled, women, minority groups and political parties. However the fact that the Minister is not 
required to ascertain prospective appointees’ expertise leads to arbitrary appointments, which might not 
include those able to represent the interest of vulnerable groups. It can therefore be challenged that their 
presence in local councils as appointed councillors does not contribute to political pluralism. Political 
pluralism would entail the existence of individuals from different political backgrounds and elected into 
council to represent their constituencies. In the case of special interest councillors, they do not have the 
                                                 
71 S 4 A (2), Urban Councils Act (2008). 
72 UN-Habitat-Good Governance. 
73 Article 2 (11), African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG) (2012). 
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mandate of the people and as such cannot be recognised as contributing to political pluralism. From the table 
of special interest councillors drawn from eighteen (18) urban councils (in two councils no appointments were 
made),74 there is no or very little evidence to show representation of vulnerable groups. Of the 57 special 
interest councillors in different towns, only three represent the interest of the disabled (Harare, Gweru and 
Masvingo). The rest of the special interests councillors have been appointed on the basis of skills such as 
business, legal, medical and educational skills. All these are considered as exclusive interest of those pursuing 
affluent lifestyles. It can therefore be argued that while the notion of appointing special interest councillors is 
noble, the practice is fraught with inconsistencies which results in the representation of the well-to-do and not 
the vulnerable groups. It can therefore be acknowledged that while there is pluralism in the composition of 
local councils as a result of the incorporation of special interest councillors that does not benefit the target 
groups. The interests of marginalised groups such as the disabled, the homeless and orphans as well as 
organised groups such as residents have either been inadequately represented or have not been represented at 
all.  
In terms of section 4A the appointment of special interest councillors is not based on any criteria, hence there 
is no provision for affirmative action. Although it is argued that special interest councillors could represent 
specific expertise, often marginalised groups such as women, the disabled and people living with HIV/AIDS, 
are not considered as a priority for representation. There is no evidence to suggest that these are equitably and 
sufficiently represented. As a result, section 4A falls short of the requirements of democratic and 
representative governance which prescribes equity as a vital condition and requirement.  
Despite the existence of an opportunity presented by section 4 A to represent the interests of disadvantaged 
and marginalised groups such as orphans, the homeless and the disabled, the MLGRUD has not taken 
advantage of it. Instead it would seem the Minister has concentrated on political survival at the expense of the 
general populations’ interests. It could therefore be argued that section 4 A has a noble intention of 
representing the interests of different sectors of society but the Minister has confined the terms of the 
legislation to those that he regards as vital for him. 
The practice of having more special interest councillors from one political party and less from another party 
does not meet the requirement of political pluralism that helps to strengthen democracy. The fact that the 
Minister appoints individuals whose skills or expertise are known confirms the likelihood that appointed 
special councillors have a contribution to make towards enhancing effectiveness of local councils.  In addition 
to the failure of the system to promote political pluralism as discussed above, it shows that the implementation 
of this legislation does not recognise other minority political parties or other people from marginalised groups 
in the community whose interest are not being represented or where there is no such evidence. As a result it 
can be noted that by appointing more special interest councillors from one political party and without being 
gender sensitive, the Minister has failed to achieve inclusiveness. It can therefore be noted that section 4A 
fails to meet the requirements of inclusiveness in representative democratic governance.  
Effective and efficient decision making 
Efficiency implies using minimum resources to get maximum output and making sound decisions. In the case 
of local government efficiency would mean using available resources economically. Although special interest 
councillors have no vote, their existence as advisors to the councils enables councils to make informed 
decisions on policy formulation and implementation. Taking cognisance of their experience in local 
government, it is assumed that they have some contribution that they can make to enhance the performance of 
local councillors.75 In terms of section 4A there is no evidence that the inclusion of special interest councillors 
has enhanced the quality of decision making. However what is evident is that the additional special interest 
councillors are an additional financial burden on local councils which contribute to the depletion of council 
financial resources.  
On the other hand the disagreements that are likely to erupt in local councils as a result of different political 
backgrounds between the elected and appointed councillors are likely to compromise of effectiveness. It can 
therefore be argued that the legislation and practice of appointing special interest councillors have not 
improved the efficiency and effectiveness of local councils. What is evident is that there has been increased 
inefficiency as local councils become increasingly bankrupt while effectiveness has decreased as evidenced by 
dilapidated infrastructure in most towns.86 
                                                 
74 In Chinhoyi and Kwekwe urban councils, no special interest councillors were appointed. 
75 UN-Habitat Urban Governance Index/ United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG); United Cities and  
Local Governments  in Africa (UCLGA); The United Cities and Local Governments of Africa; All Africa  
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The practice and implementation of section 4 A could most likely have had an impact on sound decision 
making processes. Sound decision making involves incorporating the community in making decisions that 
affect the lives of the people in that community. Although from a policy point of view, the infusion of special 
interest councillors would facilitate sound decision making, the practice of appointing the councillors is 
fraught with inconsistencies. This eventually defeats the purpose of inserting skills in local councils.  
Despite the assumption that the presence of special interest councillors enhances the efficiency and 
effectiveness of local councils, but the differences in political ideologies of elected and appointed should not 
be taken lightly. There is evidence from media reports that the political rivalry between the elected MDC 
councillors and the appointed special interest councillors, have led to fraught relationships that would 
negatively impact on sound decision making. As a result it can be pointed out that the presence of experienced 
former ZANU PF councillors would likely not contribute to sound decision making or strengthen council 
debates. 
Cooperation between levels of government 
Cooperation between levels of government entails the cooperation, co-existence and interaction between 
different levels of government to implement policies. Cooperative governance enhances the efficient 
implementation of public policies as different levels of  
                                                                                                                                                                                              
Ministerial Conference on Decentralisation (AMCOD); Charter for Popular Participation in Development and 
Transformation (CPPDT). African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG); Kigali 
Declaration; Victoria Declaration; COPAC Draft. 
86Combnbed Harare Residents’ Association (2010). 
government complement each other in this regard. From the composition of special interest councillors 
provided above, there is no evidence of cooperation between the Minister who represents central government, 
and local authorities, in the appointment of special interest councillors. Section 4A does not recognise or 
facilitate for cooperation between different levels of government. Also, in implementing section 4A the 
Minister does not act in the spirit of cooperation. In making the appointments, the Minister does not consult 
local councils. The way section 4A has been implemented leaves local councils with no role to play in the 
appointment of these councillors despite the fact that the councillors will serve together in local councils. This 
is a recipe for failure as it creates a rift between central and local governments. It also shows that the 
interaction between central and local government is not in the spirit of cooperation but one in which local 
councils receive and implement policies handed down from central government. It can therefore be argued 
that section 4 A does not comply with the requirements of cooperative governance because there is no 
evidence of consultation between central government (represented by the Minister) and local government 
(represented by local councils).  
OBSERVATIONS 
The discussions about the practice and implementation of section 4 A of the Urban Councils  
Act concluded that in appointing special interest councillors in urban local councils, the Minister is not 
required to consult residents or local councils. The Minister eventually makes the appointments of special 
interest councillors at his discretion. This was further shown by the composition of special interest councillors 
appointed in different urban councils in which the Minister did not comply with legislation. While in some 
cases the Minister appointed less than the required quota, in other cases the Minister did not appoint any 
special councillors at all. There is evidence to show that the practice and law of section 4 A compromises the 
accountability of the appointed special interest councillors who should be answerable to the Minister. 
Therefore the author makes recommendations that would strengthen the practice and implementation of 
appointing councillors in urban local councils. In addition the author may also seek to provide ways in which 
local the operation of councils can be strengthened. 
The author has also observed that the tenure of the appointees rests with the Minister who can either renew or 
terminate it. It has also been shown that most appointed councillors belong to ZANU PF which practice does 
not translate to political pluralism because there should be other factors that may be considered in appointing 
special interest councillors other than putting emphasis on political affiliation. 
CONCLUSION  
It has been noted that the practice and implementation of section 4 A of the Urban Councils Act has not 
complied with the critical features of representative governance extrapolated from international instruments 
and the COPAC draft. It was noted that the COPAC draft contains crucial elementsmost relevant to Zimbabwe 
that would provide democratic local governance. If political developments in Zimbabwe are anything to go 
by, there are chances that the COPAC draft will pass through the referendum stage and become the new 
Public Policy and Administration Research                                                                                                                                       www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-5731(Paper) ISSN 2225-0972(Online) 
Vol.3, No.12, 2013 
 
127 
Constitution of Zimbabwe. In the event that the COPAC draft sails through the referendum and eventually 
become law, local government will be transformed. It also remains to be seen whether the practice of 
appointing special interest councillors as provided by section 4 A will survive under the new Constitution. 
However, given the acrimony between the two major political parties in the country, namely ZANU PF and 
the MDC-T, it remains to be seen whether the two political rivals would collaborate or stick to democratic 
principles of governance.  
From the way section 4 has been implemented, there it is evident that the current system of local government 
is untenable and need to be transformed or overhauled. This means that either section 4 A be repealed or 
amended to modify or leave out section 4 A and replace it with legislation that promotes democratic 
governance. These remarks, if considered, would go a long way in transforming local governance in general 
and the operations of local councils in achieving their objectives. 
REFERENCES 
Books  
Curtin DM & Wessel A (eds) Good governance and the European Union: reflections on concepts, institutions 
and substance (2005) New York: Intersentia. 
Litvack J Ahmad J & Bird R Rethinking decentralisation in developing countries (1998) Washington DC: The 
World Bank.  
Mararike CG Grassroots Leadership: The Process of Rural Development in Zimbabwe (1995) Harare: 
University of Zimbabwe. 
Olowu D & Wunsch JS Local Governance in Africa: The Challenges of Democratic Decentralisation (2004) 
Lynne Rienner: Boulder. 
Yoshikuni T African Urban Experiences in Colonial Zimbabwe: A Social History of Harare before 1925 
(2006) Harare: Weaver Press. 
Book Chapters 
Chakaipa S ‘Local government institutions and elections’ in De Visser J; Steytler N & Machingauta N 2 (eds) 
Local Government Reform in Zimbabwe: A policy dialogue (Community Law Centre: Cape Town) 2010. 
Chatiza K ‘Can Local Government steer socio-economic transformation in Zimbabwe?’ in De Visser J, 
Steytler N & Machingauta N 5 (eds) Local government reform in Zimbabwe: a policy dialogue (Community 
Law Centre: Cape Town) 2010. 
Hammar A ‘The making and unma(s)king of local government in Zimbabwe’ in Hammar A, Raftopoulos B 
and Jensen S (eds) Zimbabwe’s Unfinished Business: Rethinking Land, State and nation in the Context of 
Crisis (Harare: Weaver Press) 2003. 
Mushamba S ‘The powers and functions of local government authorities’ in DeVisser J; Steytler N & 
Machingauta N 4 (eds) Local Government Reform in Zimbabwe: A policy dialogue (Community Law Centre: 
Cape Town) 2010. 
Journal articles 
Agarwala A and Ribot J ‘Accountability in decentralisation: A framework with South Asian and West African 
cases’ (1999) 33 Journal of Developing Areas (4) 473 502. 
Bland G ‘Overcoming a decade of crisis: Zimbabwe’s Local Authorities in transition’ (2011) 31 Journal of 
Public Administration and Development (4) 340 350. 
Frederickson H; Wood G C and Logan B ‘How American City Governments Have Changed: The Evolution of 
the Model City Charter’ (2001) 90 National Civic Review (1) 12 35. 
Grnchalla- Wesiershi T ‘A Framework for Understanding “Soft Law”’ (2001) 30 McGill Law Journal 37 88. 
Hoyos A & Uys F ‘Theoretical Perspective to Fiscal Decentralisation in Developing Countries’(2008)  43 
Journal of Public Administration  (1) 26 43. 
Jonga W & Chirisa I ‘Urban Local Governance in the Crucible: Empirical Overtones of Central Government 
Meddling in Local Urban Councils Affairs in Zimbabwe’ (2009) 3 Theoretical and Empirical Researches in 
Urban Management (12) 166 182. 
Madhekeni A & Zhou G ‘Legal and Institutional Framework: The “Achilles Heel” Of Local Authorities and 
Raison D’etre of Ministerial Intervention in Zimbabwe’ (2012) 2 Journal of Public Administration and 
Governance (3) 19 32. 
Makumbe J ‘Is there a civil society in Africa?’ (1998) 74 International Affairs (2) 305 317. 
Mhlahlo SR ‘Assessment of Urban Governance in Zimbabwe: Case of the City of Gweru’ (2007) 23 Eastern 
Africa Social Science Research Review (1) 107 128.  
Orsello GP ‘Governance in the European Union” (2003) RSC Harvard Law School ‘Response to the European 
Commission’s White Paper on Governance’. 
Public Policy and Administration Research                                                                                                                                       www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-5731(Paper) ISSN 2225-0972(Online) 
Vol.3, No.12, 2013 
 
128 
RadioVOP ‘Bulawayo Rejects Chombo's Imposed Councillors’Zimbabwe Inclusive Government (ZIG)Watch: 
Issue 15 - 27 April 2010 5. 
Working papers  
Afonso A; Schuknecht L & Tanzi V Public Sector Efficiency:Evidence for New EU Member States and 
Emerging Markets (2006) European Central Bank, Working Paper Series No. 581. 
Jordan JD Local Government in Zimbabwe: An Overview (1984) Mambo Occasional PapersSocio-Economic 
Series No. 17 (Gweru: Mambo Press). 
Matumbike CWE Local Government in Zimbabwe 1970-2009: Historical Perspectives and Reflections on the 
Last Four Decades Discussion document prepared for UNPD-Ministry of Local Government. 
Conference Papers  
All Africa Ministerial Conference on Decentralisation (AMCOD) 1999. 
Mimicopoulos MG ‘Department of Economic and Social Affairs’ presentation to the United  
Nations World Tourism Organisation Knowledge Management International Seminar on Global Issues in 
Local Government: Tourism Policy Approaches, Madrid, 27-29 September 2006. 
Government of Zimbabwe ‘Local Governance for Poverty Reduction: The case of Zimbabwe’ Paper prepared 
for presentation at the Africa Governance Forum, Maputo, May 23-25 2002. 
Zimbabwe Institute ‘Local Government: Policy Review’ (Cape Town 2005).Strategic Reflection Workshop, 
Kadoma, 10-12 June 2009. 
Policy Briefs 
Graham J; Amos B & Plumtree T Principles for Good Governance in the 21st century (2003) Policy Brief No. 
15, Institute on Governance. 
Helmsing HH Transforming Rural Local Government: Zimbabwe Post independence Experience No.0104.02 
(2004). 
Reports 
African Development Bank African Development Report 2001:  Fostering Good Governance in Africa 
(2011)Oxford : Oxford University Press.  
Shah & Shah (2006) Governance: The World Bank’s Experience (2007) Washington D.C: World Bank. 
Internet Sources  
The Elected Councillors’ Association of Zimbabwe (ECAZ) ‘Chombo uses councillors as spies’ The 
Zimbabwean 7 August 2012 2; Available at 
http://www.thezimbabwean.co.uk/news/zimbabwe/60002/chombo-uses-councilors-asspies.html [Accessed 12 
August 2012]. 
Grabmore G ‘Ignorance Chombo's primary aim is to frustrate MDC councils’New Zimbabwe Forums ,18 May 
2012 4. Available at http://forum.newzimbabwe.com/index.php?/topic/57413-even-the-strongest-zanoids-will-
beshocked/page__st__20 [Accessed 26 August 2012]. 
Madava T ‘Anger over special interest councilors’The Financial Gazette16 August 2012 2; Available at 
http://www.financialgazette.co.zw/national-report/13793-anger-over-specialinterest-councillors.html [24 
August 2012]. 
Municipal Reporter ‘Chikumbirike named councillor’ The Chronicle, 23 August 2011 4. Available at 
http://www.chronicle.co.zw/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=19177:chiku mbirike-named-
councillor&catid=38:local-news&Itemid=131 [Accessed 17 July 2012] 
Rejoice Ngwenya  ‘Tsvangirai’s 2013 electoral albatross” in Kubatana.net 20 April 2012 6.  
http://www.kubatana.net/html/archive/opin/120420rn.asp?sector=LEGISL&year=2012&rang e_start=31 
Accessed 26 August 2012]. 
Staff Reporter ‘Mangwana raps 'undemocratic' Chombo’’ New Zimbabwe, 25 August 2012 3,  
Available at http://www.newzimbabwe.com/news-8275    
Mangwana%20raps%20Chombo%20power/news.aspx 
Chimhete C & Ndlovu N ‘Chombo unsettles MDC-T run councils’ The Standard 
Sunday, 22 April 2012 . Available at http://www.thestandard.co.zw/local/34891-chombounsettles-mdc-t-run-
councils.html [Accesed 6 July 2012]. 
Ndlovu N  ‘Zimbabwe: Special Interest Councillors Dismissed’The Standard, 14 April  
20125. Available at http://allafrica.com/stories/201204160265.html [Accessed2 July 2012]. 
Sibanda A ‘Bulawayo residents and Chombo to clash over special interest councilors’. Bulawayo24, 16 May 
2012 6.Available at http://bulawayo24.com/index-id-news-sc-localbyo-15273-art icle- 
Bulawayo+residents+and+Chombo+to+clash+over+special+interest+councillors.html 
Public Policy and Administration Research                                                                                                                                       www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-5731(Paper) ISSN 2225-0972(Online) 
Vol.3, No.12, 2013 
 
129 
HRT ‘Chitungwiza Residents raise concerns with Minister Chombo’SWAfrica Radio, 13 February 2012 1. 
Available at http://www.swradioafrica.com/chitungwiza-residents-raiseconcerns-with-minister-
chombo/[Accessed 12 June 2012]. 
Staff Reporter ‘Bulawayo: Chombo Tries (again) to impose “Special Interest” Councillors’Zimbabwe Metro. 
Available at  http://www.zimbabwemetro.com/bulawayochombo-tries-again-to-impose-special-interest-
councillors/ 
‘European Charter on development cooperation in support of Local Governance,’ Available on 
http://as03.cooltoad.com/go/desktop?o=item:290412737:1.2:CharterEULocal%20Governanc e.pdf  [Accessed 
on 20 July 2009] 
Shane PA (ed) Building Democracy Through Online Citizen Deliberation. A Framework for Action (2009) 
http://moritzlaw. osu.edu/pldd/docs/building democracy.pdf 28.4 
Theses 
Madzivanyika L The impact of weaknesses in the Urban Councils Act on efficient and effective service 
delivery in urban local councils in Zimbabwe (unpublishedLLM Research paper, University of the Western 
Cape, 2011). 
Machingauta N A legal analysis of the appointment of caretakers to act as council in terms of Zimbabwe’s 
section 80 of the Urban Councils Act (unpublishedLLM Thesis, University of the Western Cape 2010). 
Legislation 
Urban Councils Act [Chapter 29:13] Act 6 of 2008. 
Rural and District Councils Act [Chapter 29:15] Act 4 of 1996. 
Legislative Instruments  
African Charter on Human and People’s Rights. 
African Union Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG) 2012. 
Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation (CPPDT) 1990. 
European Charter of Self-Government 1996. 
Kigali Declaration 2006. 
United Cities and Local Governments of Africa (UCLGA) 1990. 
UN-HABITAT. "Legal issues for city-to-city co-operation: a framework for local government international 
action" Seville, Spain in January 2007. 
United Nations Millennium Development Goals (2000). 
Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR) 1948. 
Victoria Falls Declaration 1999. 
Zimbabwe Parliamentary Select Committee Draft Constitution (COPAC) July 2012 
This academic article was published by The International Institute for Science, 
Technology and Education (IISTE).  The IISTE is a pioneer in the Open Access 
Publishing service based in the U.S. and Europe.  The aim of the institute is 
Accelerating Global Knowledge Sharing. 
 
More information about the publisher can be found in the IISTE’s homepage:  
http://www.iiste.org 
 
CALL FOR JOURNAL PAPERS 
The IISTE is currently hosting more than 30 peer-reviewed academic journals and 
collaborating with academic institutions around the world.  There’s no deadline for 
submission.  Prospective authors of IISTE journals can find the submission 
instruction on the following page: http://www.iiste.org/journals/   The IISTE 
editorial team promises to the review and publish all the qualified submissions in a 
fast manner. All the journals articles are available online to the readers all over the 
world without financial, legal, or technical barriers other than those inseparable from 
gaining access to the internet itself. Printed version of the journals is also available 
upon request of readers and authors.  
MORE RESOURCES 
Book publication information: http://www.iiste.org/book/ 
Recent conferences:  http://www.iiste.org/conference/ 
IISTE Knowledge Sharing Partners 
EBSCO, Index Copernicus, Ulrich's Periodicals Directory, JournalTOCS, PKP Open 
Archives Harvester, Bielefeld Academic Search Engine, Elektronische 
Zeitschriftenbibliothek EZB, Open J-Gate, OCLC WorldCat, Universe Digtial 
Library , NewJour, Google Scholar 
 
 
